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TEACHING NEW FEDERALISM 
ALLISON H. EID* 
Thanks to the Court’s “New Federalism” revival, the concept of 
federalism—a constitutional norm that was once thought to be judicially 
unenforceable—now occupies a good deal of the federal judiciary’s time.1  Not 
surprisingly, the renewed judicial attention to federalism has brought on a 
revival in legal scholarship on the subject;2 where the courts go, the 
commentators (myself included) soon follow.3  Yet with all of the legal 
commentary, it seems that an important question remains largely 
unaddressed—namely, whether, and to what extent, New Federalism affects 
the teaching of federalism.  Most obviously, the “federalism” section of any 
professor’s Constitutional Law syllabus will have grown simply due to the 
increase in the number of cases.  But more fundamentally, with the coming of 
New Federalism, the approach to teaching the concept of federalism must 
change.  To put it simply, the only way to make sense of the New Federalism 
is to study the old. 
*** 
Any study of New Federalism must begin with United States v. Lopez,4 in 
which the Court, for the first time in almost sixty years, struck down an act of 
Congress as falling outside of its Commerce Clause authority.  Prior to Lopez, 
the Court had said, both implicitly and explicitly, that it had gotten out of the 
 
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law.  I would like to thank Rick Collins, 
Troy Eid, Pierre Schlag, and Phil Weiser for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this piece. 
 1. On judicial enforcement of federalism norms, see generally Allison H. Eid, Federalism 
and Formalism, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1191 (2003) [hereinafter Eid, Federalism]. 
 2. See generally Mark J. Loewenstein, The Supreme Court, Rule 10b-5 and the 
Federalization of Corporate Law, 39 IND. L. REV. (2005) (commenting on the proliferation of 
law review articles on the topic of New Federalism). 
 3. See Eid, Federalism, supra note 1; Allison H. Eid, The Property Clause and New 
Federalism, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1241 (2004) [hereinafter Eid, Property Clause]. 
 4. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  Certainly there were signs of New Federalism prior to Lopez, 
including, most prominently, Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), in which the Court 
instructed federal courts to avoid statutory interpretations that would raise federalism problems.  
But, because Gregory struck down no statute, it did not have the impact on the legal community 
that Lopez did.  See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, High Court Kills Law Banning Guns in a School 
Zone, N.Y. TIMES, April 27, 1995, at 1. 
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federalism business. 5  It did so implicitly in 1937, when it upheld the National 
Labor Relations Act against a Commerce Clause challenge in NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp.,6 after having struck down similar congressional attempts 
at regulating labor issues (the familiar “switch in time saves nine”).7  It did so 
expressly in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,8 when it stated that 
“the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on the 
Commerce Clause to protect the ‘States as States’ is one of process rather than 
one of result”9—that is, any limitation would stem from the political process, 
rather than judicial review of the result of the process.10  Garcia by its own 
terms only applied to the Tenth Amendment context,11 but as a practical matter 
its sentiment extended to federalism issues more generally.12 
Prior to Lopez, then, Garcia was the beginning and the end of federalism.  
The federalism section of the Constitutional Law course I took in law school 
(six years prior to Lopez) focused almost exclusively on the fact that the Court 
had exited the federalism scene.  We certainly debated the question of whether 
the Court was right or wrong in doing so, but the fact that it had done so was 
clear.  Thus, we spent very little time looking at pre-Jones & Laughlin 
caselaw—a period marked by active judicial enforcement of federalism 
norms.13  Nor did we spend much time on post-Jones & Laughlin caselaw——
 
 5. For example, the first edition of the Stone et al. Constitutional Law casebook included a 
section titled “The Purported Demise of Judicially Enforced Federalism Limits on Congressional 
Power.”  GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 181212 (1986). 
 6. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 7. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down on Commerce 
Clause grounds the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, which, among other things, 
established local coal boards to administer a code that allowed employees to bargain collectively).  
For a description of the switch in time, see FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: A 
RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY 221239 (1990) and William E. Leuchtenburg, Showdown on the 
Court, Smithsonian, May 2005, at 10613. 
 8. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 9. Id. at 554. 
 10. For a discussion of the political process theory of federalism enforcement, see Herbert 
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and 
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954); Jesse H. Choper, The 
Scope of National Power Vis-à-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE 
L.J. 1552 (1977); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of 
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000). 
 11. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 536.  
 12. John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 133334 
(1997) (noting that “[w]hen combined with the Court’s post-1930s refusal to enforce limits on the 
general commerce clause power, [Garcia’s process language] suggested that the Court was 
announcing its intention to withdraw from all questions involving the boundaries between federal 
and state power”). 
 13. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 238 (1936) (striking down federal coal 
regulation on the ground that coal production had only an indirect effect on commerce); A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding that Congress could not 
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a time during which the Court upheld congressional acts against commerce 
challenges as long as the regulated activity had a “substantial effect” on 
interstate commerce (which it consistently found to exist).14  Indeed, we did 
not even read Jones & Laughlin itself.  Certainly, an in-depth look at the pre-
Jones & Laughlin judicial enforcement era may have provided an interesting 
counterpoint to the then-current regime of judicial nonenforcement.  Similarly, 
consideration of the post-Jones & Laughlin era of de facto judicial 
nonenforcement would have provided an interesting comparison to Garcia’s 
express declaration.  But for the most part, the historical cases seemed to have 
no modern application or legacy. 
This all changed with the Court’s decision in Lopez.  Suddenly, the Court 
was back on the federalism train.  But where was that train going, how fast was 
it moving, and what did it look like?  These are the questions that today’s 
Constitutional Law students must ask themselves and answer—and they can do 
that only with a firm foundation in both pre- and post-Jones & Laughlin 
jurisprudence.  In other words, perhaps the best way to understand where the 
train is going is to look at where it has been.15 
When confronting the Fifth Circuit’s holding that the Gun Free School 
Zones Act fell outside Congress’s commerce authority,16 the Court in Lopez 
had (at least) three options.  First, it could apply the easily satisfied “substantial 
effects” test and uphold the legislation.  Second, it could strike down the 
legislation using a test garnered from the pre-Jones & Laughlin era of judicial 
enforcement, which would mean overturning some, if not all, of the post-Jones 
& Laughlin cases.  Or third, it could preserve the post-Jones & Laughlin cases 
but still strike down the legislation using a new test. 
 
regulate the working conditions of chicken processors because the chickens being processed were 
no longer in the “current” or “flow” of interstate commerce); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 
(1918) (striking down federal child labor regulation on the ground that child labor was a purely 
local issue); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (striking down the Sherman Act 
as unconstitutionally applied to sugar refining on the ground that the commerce power did not 
reach “manufacturing”). 
 14. See, e.g.,Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (upholding federal wheat quotas 
as applied to Roscoe Filburn, who had grown more wheat than his quota allowed but used the 
wheat for purely personal, intrastate purposes because such personal consumption had a 
“substantial economic effect on interstate commerce”); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding federal prohibition on racial discrimination in 
accommodations); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding federal prohibition 
on racial discrimination in restaurants); Hodel v. Virginia Mining and Reclamation Assn., Inc., 
452 U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding federal regulation of strip mining); Perez v. United States, 402 
U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding federal prohibition on loan-sharking). 
 15. I have made this same argument for a historical approach to tort reform.  See Allison H. 
Eid, Epsteinian Torts: Richard A. Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
89 (2001). 
 16. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993). 
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We know, of course, that the Court chose option number three.  But 
constitutional law students will find it difficult to figure out why it did so (or, 
indeed, to figure out that there were in fact three options from which to choose) 
without a firm understanding of pre- and post-Jones & Laughlin jurisprudence.  
Without such an understanding, they will simply have to memorize the Court’s 
holding—that is, that gun possession is not “economic activity” and thus falls 
outside of Congress’s commerce authority.17 
History makes clear to students the challenge facing the Court in Lopez.  
Clearly, the Lopez majority was searching for a way to put some teeth back 
into the Commerce Clause.  Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor had 
dissented in Garcia,18 and the Court personnel had changed a good deal in the 
decade since the decision had come down.19  And Congress—lulled into a 
Garcia-induced complacency—had passed a statute that “contain[ed] [no] 
requirement that the [gun] possession be connected in any way to interstate 
commerce.”20  In other words, it had provided the Court with an easy target.  
The Lopez majority seemed comfortable jettisoning, sub silentio, Garcia’s 
judicial nonenforcement language—that is, by striking down the legislation as 
exceeding Congress’s commerce authority.21  But it seemed far more reluctant 
to cast doubt on post-Jones & Laughlin precedent. 
Again, history explains why.  The Court majority notes, for example, that 
Jones & Laughlin and subsequent cases 
ushered in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that greatly expanded the 
previously defined authority of Congress under that Clause.  In part, this was a 
recognition of the great changes that had occurred in the way business was 
carried on in this country. . . . But the doctrinal change also reflected a view 
that earlier Commerce Clause cases artificially had constrained the authority of 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce.22 
In other words, the Court was not going back to the pre-Jones & Laughlin 
days—at least not expressly.  But students cannot evaluate whether going back 
 
 17. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). 
 18. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) (Powell, J., 
dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, J., and O’Connor, J.).   
 19. By the time Lopez came around, Justice Rehnquist had been elevated to Chief Justice 
with the departure of Chief Justice Burger, and had been replaced by Justice Scalia.  Additionally, 
Justice Powell had been replaced by Justice Kennedy.  These changes, however, simply swapped 
a Garcia opponent for a Garcia opponent.  The fifth vote for the federalism revival came with the 
appointment of Justice Thomas, a Garcia opponent who replaced Justice Marshall, a Garcia 
supporter.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549. 
 20. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. 
 21. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based 
Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459 (2001) (suggesting that “the Rehnquist Court has 
implicitly rejected [Garcia’s judicial nonenforcement language] by rejuvenating the judicial 
protection of federalism”). 
 22. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556. 
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to the pre-Jones & Laughlin days would indeed be a bad thing (or whether the 
Court was actually returning to that era, as the dissenters claimed)23 without 
exposure to that historical caselaw. 
History also explains how the majority comes to employ the “economic 
activity” test.  Recognizing that there must be “outer limits” to the commerce 
power, the Court felt obligated to give some idea of their whereabouts.24  It 
thus faced the challenge of preserving precedent embracing the “substantial 
effects” test while limiting the “substantial effects” test itself.  The majority 
found its limiting principle by asking the following question: What do the 
intrastate consumption of homegrown wheat (Wickard v. Filburn),25 
accommodation of interstate guests (Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States),26 
the use of interstate supplies by restaurants (Katzenbach v. McClung),27 
intrastate loan-sharking (Perez v. United States),28 and intrastate strip mining 
(Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n),29 all have in 
common?30  Answer: They all involve “economic activity.”31  With the 
“economic activity” test, the Court managed not to overturn a single case (at 
least not expressly), while at the same time finding a standard that packed 
some punch.  But without a familiarity with Wickard, Heart of Atlanta, 
Katzenbach, Perez, and Hodel, students cannot determine whether (as the 
dissenters claimed) those cases were preserved in name only.32 
An understanding of the pre-Jones & Laughlin era also gives much needed 
context to Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice 
O’Connor.33  Justice Kennedy suggests that “[t]he history of the judicial 
struggle to interpret the Commerce Clause during the transition from the 
economic system the Founders knew to the single, national market still 
emergent in our own era . . . gives me some pause about today’s decision[.]”34  
Students need to know what that “judicial struggle” looked like in order to 
understand why Justice Kennedy seemed so intent in avoiding it. 
They need to know, for example, about Carter v. Carter Coal Co., in 
which the Court struck down labor regulations in the coal industry as beyond 
Congress’s commerce authority on the ground that coal production had only an 
 
 23. Id. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 62728 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 24. Id. at 557. 
 25. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).  For an extended history of Roscoe Filburn’s struggle with wheat 
production, see Jim Chen, Filburn’s Legacy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1719 (2003). 
 26. 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
 27. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
 28. 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
 29. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
 30. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559–60 (1995). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 628 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 33. Id. at 568–83 (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by O’Connor, J.). 
 34. Id. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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“indirect” effect on commerce.35  They need to read A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, in which the Court struck down federal work condition 
regulations as applied to chicken processors where the chickens being 
processed were no longer in a “current” or “flow” of interstate commerce.36  
They need to be familiar with Hammer v. Dagenhart, in which the Court 
invalidated the Child Labor Act on the ground that child labor was a “purely 
local” issue,37 and United States v. E.C. Knight Co., in which the Court found 
that the Sherman Act as applied to sugar refining was unconstitutional because 
the Commerce Clause did not reach “manufacturing.”38  They need to 
understand that such devices as the “stream of commerce” metaphor and 
distinctions between “direct” and “indirect” effects on commerce, “purely 
local” and national issues, and “manufacturing” and “commerce” were keeping 
the federal government from accomplishing important objectives.39 
This same history sheds light on Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion, in 
which he argues that the “substantial effects” test is inconsistent with 
constitutional text and should be reconsidered.40  What would a world look like 
if Congress did not have the authority to regulate all that substantially affected 
commerce?  Again, the pre-Jones & Laughlin caselaw becomes vital in 
answering this question (or at least in raising another—namely, whether the 
expansion of commerce authority should have been accomplished via 
constitutional amendment, as presumably Justice Thomas would have 
preferred). 
A consideration of constitutional federalism does not, of course, end with 
the commerce cases.  On the contrary, with the Court setting limitations on the 
commerce power, other sources of congressional authority—for example, 
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Spending Clause,41 and the Treaty 
Power42—naturally increase in importance (in legal scholarship as well as the 
 
 35. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
 36. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 37. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
 38. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
 39. Additionally, students should be familiar with the fact that the Court during this period 
upheld federal regulations, including intrastate train rates in Houston, East & West Texas Railway 
Co. v. United States (the Shreveport Rate Cases), 234 U.S. 342 (1914), and the interstate sale of 
foreign lottery tickets in Champion v. Ames (the Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903).  The 
important question they must face is how to differentiate, if possible, these cases from the cases in 
which the federal regulation was struck down. 
 40. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 587–89 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  For a discussion on the importance of the Spending Clause, 
see Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, The Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 
89 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2003), and the Chapman Law Review Spending Clause Symposium, 4 
CHAP. L. REV. 1 (2001). 
 42. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  For an argument that the Violence Against Women Act, 
struck down on commerce grounds in Morrison, could have been sustained as an exercise of the 
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classroom).43  Again to return to the Constitutional Law class I took in law 
school, we spent no time on the Spending Clause or the Treaty Power, and we 
covered section 5 only briefly.  Congressional power was synonymous with the 
commerce power.  In a post-New Federalism age, by contrast, Congress must 
think harder about the source of its authority (as must constitutional law 
students).  In sum, teaching New Federalism means teaching the Commerce 
Clause—and beyond. 
In the end, it is my hope that students will leave Constitutional Law 
courses with a greater understanding of the contours and focus of New 
Federalism if they are armed with historical context.44  But I also hope that 
historical context will give them something more—namely, the basis for 
answering the question “why do we care?” 
After a class or two on New Federalism, students start asking why it 
matters whether the federal or state government has the authority to regulate 
guns within 1000 feet of schools,45 pools of water used by migratory birds,46 
the use of marijuana for medical purposes,47 or the amount of damages to be 
 
Treaty Power, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. 
Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135, 166–67 (2000). 
 43. Another example is the Property Clause.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.  Commentators 
have turned to the Property Clause in the wake of  Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County 
v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), in which the Court seemed 
poised to limit the reach of the Commerce Clause in the environmental context.  See generally, 
Eid, Property Clause, supra note 3. 
 44. This historical approach is possible with some casebooks but not with others.  Casebooks 
by Stone et al. (which I use), Brest et al., Chemerinsky, and Massey use Lopez as a principal case 
and contain extensive historical materials, including excerpts of most, if not all, of the cases 
mentioned above.  See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 185–229 (5th ed. 
2005); PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 355-69, 464–76, 512–33 (4th ed. 2000); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 106–59 (2001); and CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND 
LIBERTIES 147–89 (2d ed. 2005).  By contrast, casebooks by Cohen et al. and Choper et al., do 
not include Lopez as a major case (instead opting for the follow-on case of United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)), and thus in my view minimize the impact of Lopez’s break with 
the past.  JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 69–
108 (9th ed. 2001); WILLIAM COHEN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
162–93 (12th ed. 2005).  Additionally, Cohen et al. uses Justice Kennedy’s historical summary in 
Lopez “in lieu of more extensive treatment of [historical] developments.”  COHEN ET AL., supra at 
163. 
 45. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549 (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as beyond 
the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause). 
 46. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, 531 U.S. at 174 (finding that the 
“Migratory Bird Rule,” an administrative rule giving the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
jurisdiction over intrastate waters used by migratory birds, exceeded the Corps’ authority under 
the Clean Water Act, and suggesting that the rule “would result in a significant impingement of 
the States’ traditional and primary power over land and water use”). 
 47. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 2909 (2004). 
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awarded for medical malpractice judgments?48  At bottom, federalism is a 
structural concept—a structural concept with substantive effects, to be sure, 
but a structural concept nonetheless.49  While students immediately grasp the 
significance of the rights-based material in Constitutional Law (the Court’s 
substantive due process jurisprudence, for instance) they have a harder time 
understanding the importance of dividing power between the national and state 
governments.  As Professor Margaret Stewart put it, “I fear most students who 
come into the class unengaged in structural politics and law remain unengaged, 
and this suspicion is one of the reasons teaching constitutional law can be 
frustrating.”50 
That is where historical context comes in again.  Certainly the historical 
foundations of federalism are familiar, but worth repeating.  As viewed by the 
framers, federalism was not an end in and of itself, but rather a means to an 
end.  As Justice O’Connor wrote in Gregory v. Ashcroft, the framers 
understood that “. . . . a healthy balance of power between the States and the 
Federal Government [would] reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either 
front . . . .  In the tension between federal and state power lies the promise of 
liberty.”51  With this historical explanation in hand, students should ask (and 
answer) the important question: namely, whether New Federalism actually 
furthers this “liberty-enhancing” goal.52 
Take the case of medical marijuana, for example.  Prior to New 
Federalism, the use of marijuana for medical purposes clearly would have had 
a substantial effect on interstate commerce—anything did.  In the New 
Federalism era, however, the answer is not as easy; indeed, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the use of marijuana for medical purposes is not “economic 
activity.”53  The Supreme Court may disagree.54  Does the conflict between 
 
 48. See Allison H. Eid, Tort Reform and Federalism: The Supreme Court Talks, Bush 
Listens, HUM. RTS., Fall 2002 at 10 (describing how the Bush Administration is dealing with the 
federalism issues raised by pending federal medical malpractice legislation). 
 49. See Clarence Thomas, Why Federalism Matters, Remarks at Drake University Law 
School’s Dwight D. Opperman Lecture (Sept. 24, 1999), in 48 DRAKE L. REV. 231, 234 (2000) 
(describing federalism as a “structural safeguard for individual liberty”). 
 50. Margaret G. Stewart, Notes on Notes, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 979, 983–84 (1998) 
(reviewing GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3rd ed. 1996)). 
 51. 501 U.S. 452, 458–59 (1991). 
 52. Numerous commentators have suggested it does not.  See, e.g., Eid, Federalism, supra 
note 1 at 1191–92.  But see id. at 1192 (arguing that the Court has been cognizant of federalism 
values in the New Federalism decisions). 
 53. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 2909 
(2004). 
 54. Commentators have predicted that, based on the Justices’ comments at oral argument, 
the Court will uphold Congress’s authority to make marijuana use illegal, including use for 
medical purposes.  See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Court Watch, LEGAL TIMES, December 6, 2004, at 12 
(noting that “[i]n spite of the conservative majority’s interest in strengthening state powers, most 
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federal and state authorities over medical marijuana—a conflict imposed by 
New Federalism——actually enhance liberty?  Attention Constitutional Law 
students: You be the judge. 
 
justices seemed skeptical of the argument that California could defy the federal Controlled 
Substances Act by allowing surely in-state, noncommercial distributions of marijuana for medical 
use”); Richard A. Epstein, Rethink “Wickard,” NAT’L L.J., January 17, 2005, at 27 (noting that 
“the consensus after oral argument is that medical marijuana programs are doomed”). 
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